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I. INTRODUCTION

During its 1995 term, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to hear the case of Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.2
In doing so, the Court agreed to resolve a debate that began two decades
earlier-determining if Congress, in passing the Medical Device Amendments 3
(MDA) to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938,4 intended to
prevent potential plaintiffs from using state tort law to recover against
manufacturers who place an allegedly defective device on the market. In a
complicated web of lower court decisions, some state tort claims have been
preempted and some have been permitted pursuant to the federal law of
preemption.
This article attempts to reconcile the competing purposes of the MDA, and
to offer one alternative to effectuate Congress' purposes without preempting
some claims and permitting others. First, this article will describe the
arrangement of the MDA, including the classification provisions for medical
devices and the preemption provision of the MDA. Next, this article will
interpret the caselaw regarding preemption in general, and specifically
preemption of state tort claims by the MDA. Finally, this article seeks to
reconcile two competing purposes of Congress in enacting the MDA through
implied preemption of state tort claims, with exceptions for devices which have
never been subjected to the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) pre-market
approval process, or for which such approval was gained fraudulently.
II. THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS
Prior to the enactment of the MDA in 1976, 5 medical devices were regulated
primarily by the state through actions in tort and contract.6 The FDA's power

2116 S. Ct. 806, affd in part, rev'd in part, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996). Oral argument in Lohr
was heard on April 23,1996. At oral argument the Supreme Court justices appeared to
be skeptical of preempting all state tort claims. As Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist

noted, preemption of all state tort claims was "an extraordinary sweep." Associated
Press, Justices Skeptical in Medical Device Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 24, 1996.
3
Medical Device Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-295 (1976).
4
TheFood, Drug and Cosmetic Actgave theFDA someauthority to regulate devices
after they had been introduced onto the market, but the Act was not widely used, except
on "quack" devices. Angela Woodley Kronenberg, King v. Collagen Corporation: FDA

Approval Insulates Medical Device Manufacturers from State Common Law Liability, 11 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563 (Spring 1995).
5

The MDA were passed in the aftermath of numerous deaths and injuries resulting
from the largely unregulated Inter-Uterine Device industry. Laura K. Jortberg, Who
Should Bear the Burden of Experimental Medical Device Testing: The Preemptive Scope of the
Medical Device Amendments under Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 963,

975 (1994).
6
Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 2240 (see lower court, 56 F.3d 1335,1339 (11th
Cir. 1995)).
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to regulate was limited to devices labeled as "drugs."7 The MDA provided the
FDA the power to regulate all medical devices.
A. Classiftation of Medical Devices
The MDA classify all medical devices into one of three categories. These
categories dictate the extent of required FDA regulation over the device. Class
I devices include those that are of little or no threat to public health,8 such as
tongue depressors or rubber gloves. Class I devices are subject only to the
generally applicable provisions included in the MDA, such as labeling
requirements and good manufacturing practice requirements. 9
Devices which pose a threat to public health, but are not generally
life-threatening, fall into the category of Class II devices. 10 Devices such as
tampons are included in this category. Like Class I devices, Class II devices are
subject to the MDA's general provisions. In addition, device-specific controls
may be enacted by the FDA to ensure the safety of these devices, including "the
promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient
registries, development and dissemination of guidelines ... , recommendations,
and other appropriate actions as the Secretary deems necessary to provide such
assurance."11 In 1990, under the Safe Medical Devices Act, Congress altered this
requirement, so that the FDA no longer needs to pass such device-specific
12
regulations.
The most regulated devices under the MDA are Class III devices, which have
the potential for an "unreasonable" risk of injury, or are designed to support or
sustain life.13 Heart pacemakers and catheters fall within this category. Less
than five percent of all medical devices are included within this
highly-regulated category.14 Beyond compliance with the general provisions

7

See Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67
(1995).
821 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (1976).
9
For further discussion on these generally applicable requirements, see supra §§
(1)(B) and (I)(C).
1021 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (1976).

11id.
12

Other changes pursuant to the 1990 Amendments included increased power of the
FDA to stop distribution and inform hospitals of potentially dangerous devices, 21
U.S.C. §360h(e)(1)(B) (1976); powerof the FDA to subpoena evidence in evaluating PMA
applications, 21 U.S.C. § 333(0(2)(A) (1976); and creation of civil penalties, up to $15,000
for each violation and $1million in any individual proceeding, for violations of the FDA
provisions, 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(1)(A) (1976).
13
1d. at § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1976).
14 Hearings Before the House Government Reform and Oversight Comm. Subcomm. on

National Economic Growth, Natural Resource and Regulatory Affairs (1995) (prepared
testimony of Grant A. Wright, President of Inventive Products, Inc.).
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devices must undergo a rigorous pre-market approval
of the MDA, Class IIl
(PMA) process before being introduced into the marketplace. 15
16

B. Good ManufacturingPracticeRequirements (GMP)

The MDA permit the FDA to enact regulations governing the "manufacture,
pre-production design validation (including a process to access the
performance of a device but not including an evaluation of the safety or
effectiveness of a device), packing, storage, and installation.. .'17of medical
devices to ensure good manufacturing practices and safety of these devices.
This provision applies to all devices, regardless of classification under the
MDA.
C. Labeling Requirements18
Although the MDA provide little guidance regarding requirements for
labeling of medical devices, regulations enacted by the FDA pursuant to its
authority under the MDA create labeling requirements for manufacturer
compliance. 19 These provisions require that the manufacturer provide a label
for any device, excepting surgical devices, indicating whether a device is for
use only upon prescription or by a physician. 20 The labeling provisions also
require a manufacturer to dictate the proper use of the device and any side
effects or hazards of the device, unless commonly known to licensed
practitioners. 21 Manufacturers must also include the date of issuance or the
date of the latest revision of the current label.22
D. The Pre-MarketApproval Process
The PMA process begins with an application to the FDA, providing to the
FDA all information which the applicant knows or reasonably should know
about the design, manufacture, use, or labeling of the device for which it seeks
approval. 23 This disclosure should include an explanation of any potential
problems regarding the device which developed or occurred during testing or
usage of the device.

1521 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (1976).
1621 U.S.C. §§ 360j() (1976).
17

Id.
1821 C.F.R. § 801.109 (1995).
19

1d.
2021 C.F.R. § 801.19(b)(1) (1995).
2121 C.F.R. § 801.109(c) (1995).
2221 C.F.R. § 801.109(e) (1995).
2321 U.S.C. § 360c(e) (1976); Understanding the FDA's Medical Device Pre-Market
Approval (PMA) Process, BIOMEDICAL MARKET NEWSL, Apr. 1,1994.
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Once the application is complete and sent to the FDA, the FDA submits the
application to an outside panel of experts for review.24 The experts generally
come from the fields of medicine, science, and manufacturing. 25 The panel then
reviews the application, and submits its recommendation to the FDA.
Although the FDA generally accepts the recommendation of the panel, it is not
26
obliged to do SO.
The PMA process is fraught with criticism. One of the most frequent
criticisms of the process is its alarming lack of speed. 27 Approval of a medical
device through the PMA process can take months or even several years. 28 One
example of the painfully slow PMA process is the situation of an artificial heart
developed by Novacor in 1984. The heart has been used successfully since 1984
throughout Europe, but could not be sold in the United States a decade later
because it had not yet received FDA approval.29 As a result of instances like
this, many medical professionals complain that "US. patients are being
deprived of the newer, more advanced generations of devices to which
European patients have access. Americans are finding that they must go abroad
to take advantage of these technologies. And US. device firms are themselves
moving production and research facilities to other countries." 30 For example,
in fiscal-year 1993, the FDA received approximately 100 new applications for
approval of Class III medical devices for market. The FDA approved only
twenty-four devices for market.31
E. Exceptions to the Pre-MarketApproval Process
When the MDA were introduced in 1976, a number of medical devices were
already on the market. Indeed, it was the defects in these devices which fueled
the legislative fire to pass the MDA. However, in passing the MDA, Congress
realized that some exceptions would need to be made to prevent the complete
disappearance of medical devices, particularly effective devices, from the

2421 U.S.C. §§ 360e(c)(1), § 360e(c)(2) (1976).
2521 U.S.C. § 360c (1976).
26

Understandingthe FDA's Medical Device Pre-MarketApproval Process,supra note 23.

27

ld.

281d.
29
30

Tom DaveyMedical Device Firms in FDA Stranglehold,S.F.Bus. TIMES, May20,1994.

HIMA's 40 New Recommendations on Reforming the FDA, BIOMEDICAL MARKEr
NEWSL., Feb. 1, 1995 (quoting report); see also Davey, supra note 29 (time period for
approval of minor modifications was an average of 195 days in 1993).
31 Understandingthe FDA's Medical Device Pre-Market Approval (PMA) Process, supra
note 23.
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market in 1976.32 As a result, three exceptions were created to the PMA
requirement. 33
Any device which was introduced before the effective date of the MDA, May
28, 1976, is exempt from the PMA requirement. 34 This provision is known as
the "grandfather clause." Additionally, any device which is currently being
tested thoroughly by the manufacturer for safety and effectiveness, in order to
stimulate development of the device, does not need to undergo the PMA
process. 35 Finally, a device which is "substantially equivalent" to a device
36
already on the market need not receive approval before marketing.
Pre-market notification of the substantially equivalent device is required in lieu
of the PMA process. 37 To be "substantially equivalent" to a device already on
the market, a device should have the same intended use and technological
characteristics or same safety and effectiveness as the device already on the
38
market.
F. Post-Market Regulation
A manufacturer's duty to report to the FDA concerning medical devices does
not end with approval under the PMA process.
Every person who is a manufacturer, importer, or distributor of a
device intended for human use shall establish and maintain such
records, make such reports, and provide such information, as the
Secretary may by regulation reasonably require to assure that such
device is not adulterated or misbranded and to otherwise assure its
safety and effectiveness.3 9
This duty to report to the FDA regarding the device includes an obligation to
report to the FDA any instance in which the manufacturer has information

32
Dale B. Hinson, High Noon for Device Preemption-A Second Opinion, 5 MEALEY'S
Lmc. REP.: DRUGS & MED. DEVICES 18 (March 4,1996).
33

According to one source, ninety-nine percent of all medical devices currently enter

the market without regulation by the PMA process through one of these exceptions.
Brief Amid Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons, Consumers Union,
Consumer Federation of America, National Women'sHealth Network, Command Trust
Network and Valv in Support of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael
Lohr, Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 2240 (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886) (citingH.R.
Rep. 808,101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6307). Presumably,
this extraordinary number will decrease as new technology develops.
3421 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A) (1976).
35

1d. at § 360j(g).

36

1d. at § 360e(b)(1)(B).

37

1d. at § 360(k).

3821 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A).
39

1d. at § 360i(a).
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which reasonably indicates that the device may have played a factor in a death
or serious injury,40 or malfunctioned such that it would have been likely to
cause death or serious injury.41 Similar obligations to report potentially
defective devices rest upon users of the devices, including doctors, hospitals,
42
ambulances, nursing homes, and outpatient treatment facilities.
Under the 1990 Amendments to the MDA, post-market surveillance is
required for devices first introduced into the market after January 1,1991, if the
device may cause serious injury or death, is intended to be used in lengthening
life, or if the device presents a serious health risk. 43 This amendment does not
apply to devices approved under the original MDA.
G. Purposesof the Act
The MDA were passed to effectuate two strong, but sometimes conflicting,
interests. The first of these interests is to promote the safety and effectiveness
of medical devices in order to protect public health. 4 The second is to
encourage the development and marketing of medical devices by creating a
uniform regulatory scheme, and to prevent overregulation of the devices so
that manufacturers can develop these new products without a prohibitive
cost. 45 The House of Representatives enumerated these competing interests
when passing the MDA:
Those involved in the development, promotion, and application of
medical devices generally agree that the public deserves more
protection against unsafe, unproven, ineffective, and experimental
medical devices. But this belief is counterbalanced by an equally strong
conviction that excessive or ill-conceived Federal device regulation
would stifle progress in this field. 46
The Senate concurred in these interests, stating that "[s]imply put, the [MDA]
sought to avoid overregulation, thus eliminating unnecessary resource costs to
industry and the government, foster incentives to encourage innovation in a

40

1d. at § 360i(a)(1)(A).
1d. at § 360i(a)(1)(B).

41

4221 U.s.c. § 360i(b).
43

1d. at § 3601.
1d. at §§ 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), 360c(a)(1)(B), 360e(d)(2).
45
1d. at §§ 3 60j(g)(1), 360k(a). See also, Richard Thornburgh, Don't Let Litigation Kill
44

Medical Miracles, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 23,1996 atA15 (quotingSen. Ted Kennedy as stating

that the FDA was "structured to guard against excessive governmental restrictions
which might inhibit innovation in the development and advancement of biomedical
products".)

46
H.R. Rep. No. 853,94th Cong.,2dSess. 10 (1976); see also, S.Rep. No. 33,94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5,12 (1976).
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relatively youthful industry and, most importantly, provide the public
47
reasonable assurances of safe and effective devices."
The struggle between these two objectives, promoting a means for ensuring
safe and effective products for consumers while preventing overregulation for
manufacturers, creates a conflict in the courts. In an ideal world, these two
objectives would work together to quickly and efficiently put a safe and
effective device on the market. The world is far from ideal, however, and when
a product is introduced into the market which is not safe, the courts are left to
balance these two competing interests.
On the one hand, to promote safe products to the greatest extent possible
would mandate that plaintiffs be permitted to maintain an action in tort or
contract against the manufacturer for the production of an unsafe product. In
prohibiting costly overregulation of manufacturers, however, the courts would
seek to prevent such state-law claims. It is the inherent conflict between these
two goals which has led to battle in the courts.
H. The Express Preemption Clause of the Medical Device Amendments
In enacting the MDA, Congress considered the possibility that state law
would potentially conflict with the new federal law. A preemption clause
within the MDA states that:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect
to a device intended for human use any requirement(1)

which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or
to any other matter included in
48 a requirement applicable to
the device under this chapter.
This provision expressly preempts state law claims which are different from or
create additional requirements to the provisions of the MDA.
Until 1996, nearly every court which had considered this language had held
that state tort law is a state "requirement" under this provision because state
tort law has the ability to require a manufacturer to endure additional testing
or modification to prevent liability.49 The plurality in the Supreme Court's
recent decision in the Medtronic case disagreed, holding that a state law is only
47S. Rep. No. 513,101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990) (discussing 1990 Amendment).
4821 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1976).
49

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992); Michael, 46 F.3d at 1323;
Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 44 F.3d 300,304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2251 (1995);
Anguiano v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 44 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1995);
Medtronic, 56 F.3d at 1342; Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994);
Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1168 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2614 (1995). But see, Kennedy v. Collagen, 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2579 (1996).
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a "requirement" if it is "specific." Section 360(k) "refers to 'requirement' many
times throughout its text. In each instance, the word is linked with language
suggesting that its focus is device-specific enactments of positive law by
legislative or administrative bodies, not the application of general rules of
common law by judges and juries."50 Whether a state law is sufficiently
"specific" to be a "requirement" is an inherently factual determination for which
the higher court provided little guidance. Furthermore, the concurring opinion
of Justice O'Connor states that a requirement need not be specific to be
preempted, so long as it is different from or additional to a federal
requirement. 5 1 The Court far from settled the issue of how specific or detailed
a law must be to trigger preemption by the MDA, or even whether the law must
be codified to be preempted.
52
The PMA process is also a "requirement applicable under this chapter."
Thus, "specific" state tort law may be preempted by the MDA to the extent that
it creates a different or additional demand upon a manufacturer.53
At first glance, this provision seems to indicate that many state law causes
of action could be preempted by the MDA. However, one provision included
in the MDA, the "Savings Clause" indicates otherwise. The Savings Clause
states that "[c]ompliance with an order [under the MDA] shall not relieve any
person from liability under Federal or State law."54 Clearly, this provision
indicates that the MDA was not intended by Congress to preempt all state and
federal liability for manufacturers. 55 However, the Savings Clause also fails to
56
state that all state tort law liability is preserved in light of the MDA.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that a "general 'remedies' savings
clause cannot be allowed to supersede the specific substantive pre-emption
provision .... 57 Thus, if congressional intent to preempt is clear, even a
Savings Clause cannot save state remedies.
Under the preemption provision of the MDA, a state may receive an
exemption from the preemption provisions if required by "compelling local
conditions" and "compliance with the requirement would not cause the device
to be in violation of any applicable requirement under this chapter".58

5OMedtronic, 518 U.S.

... , 64

U.S.L.W. 4625, 4631 (1996).

51

1d. at 4636.

52

Martello, 42 F.3d at 1169.

53

For further discussion, see infra Section IV and notes 105-107.

5421 U.S.C. § 360(h) (1976).
55

Medtronic, 56 F.3d at 1342.

56

1d.

57

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,385 (1992).

5812 U.S.C. § 360k(b) (1976).
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LAW OF PREEMPTION

Article VI of the United States Constitution states that:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the 59Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, numerous cases have held that the
Constitution, and federal law passed thereunder, is the supreme law of the
land.60 "[C]onsideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic
61
assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law."

A. Express Preemption
Preemption of state law by federal law is ultimately a question of
congressional intent. 62 Federal law preempts state law only if Congress has
indicated a clear intent to preempt by passing the federal law.63 If the federal
statute contains an express preemption provision, the courts must first look to
this provision 64 because the express preemption provision "necessarily
contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent." 65 In a close case,
the presumption is against preemption. 66

B. Implied Preemption
When congressional intent is not clearly stated in an express preemption
provision, congressional intent must be inferred. One method of inferring
congressional intent is to use the reasonable interpretation of an agency, if

59U.S.CONST. art. VI, § 2.
60
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658,663-64 (1993) (preempting state tort
claims regarding permitted speed of train as in conflict with Federal Railroad Safety
Act, but permitting claim for negligence); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (citingGibbons v. Ogden, 9 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)).
61Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
62

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2243 (1994); Forbus v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 30 F.3d 1402, 1405 (11th Cir. 1994).
63

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

64

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,95 (1983); Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810,813-14 (1995).
65CSX Transp., Inc., 507 U.S. at 664.
66

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518; Morales, 504 U.S. at 383-85.
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Congress has delegated its rulemaking authority to an agency.67 Conveniently,
the FDA has published its interpretation of the preemption provisions of the
MDA, stating that, "[s]tate or local requirements are preempted only when the
Food and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart
regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device under the act .... "68 The courts which have considered the FDA's
interpretation in analyzing preemption under the MDA have unanimously
held that the FDA's interpretation is a reasonable one.69 The problem with the
FDA's interpretation is that it fails to indicate what requirements are
sufficiently "specific" to invoke preemption.
Congressional intent to preempt may also be inferred when an implied
conflict exists. 70 An implied conflict arises whenever a person cannot comply
with both federal and state laws simultaneously 1 or if the state law stands as
an obstacle to accomplishing Congress' purpose in enacting the federal law.72
67

Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,843-44, reh'g
denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984). But see, Anguiano, 44 F.3d at 809; Cinochio v. Surgikos, Inc.,
864 F. Supp. 948,953 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 905,906-07
(D. Colo. 1994); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw. 1992).
6821 C.F.R. § 808.1 (1976).
69
Medtronic, 56 F.3d at 1345; Michael, 46 F.3d at 1324; Reeves, 44 F.3d at 304-05 (metal
bone implant causes back injury); Martello, 42 F.3d at 1169; Mendes, 18 F.3d at 17-19.
Note, however, that the Supreme Court has only considered the FDA interpretation in
reference to the MDA's express preemption provision on one occasion. Hillsborough
County, 471 U.S. at 714-15. Since rendering that decision, however, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Cipollone,a decision which many courts have held to mean that if
a federal statute has an express preemption provision, the Court may not consider any
other evidence of congressional intent in analyzing the extent of preemption. See, e.g.,
Mendes, 18 F.3d at 16; Greenwood Trust Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass., 971 F.2d 818,
823 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993) (When "Congress includes an express
preemption clause in a statute, judges ought to limit themselves to the preemptive reach
of that provision without essaying any further analysis under the various theories of
implied preemption."). But see, Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483,1487 (1995)
(holding that Cipollone does not stand for the proposition that if Congress has included
an express preemption provision, implied preemption is not possible, rather it refuses
to preempt design defect claims for truck brake systems in light of the National Safety
Act).
70
Some courts have indicated that implied preemption may not be used when, as in
this situation, an express preemption provision exists. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984
F.2d 1416, 1420 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993).
71

A variation of this type of implied preemption occurs when state standards are
more stringent than federal standards, such tha tcompliance with federal standards may
not be sufficient to prevent liability. For example, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., a
California statute regulating the labeling of weight on packages of meat was preempted
by the Federal Meat Inspection Act because the state statute failed to account for the
possibility of moisture loss, and thus, was more strict than the federal standard. 430 U.S.
519, 531 (1977).
72

FreightlinerCorp., 115 S. Ct. at 1487, (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol.10:3

A state statute which is inconsistent with the objectives of a federal statute must
yield to the federal statute.73 In Morales v. Trans World Airlines,74 for example,
the court held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which prohibited state
laws "relating to" airline rates, preempted guidelines governing the content and
format of airline advertising written by the National Association of Attorneys
General, because a significant relationship existed between the cost of
advertising and rates charged to customers. 75 Morales indicates that a conflict
may be found by looking beneath the language of the statute to the actual effect
of the laws.
When there is no conflict between state and federal law, preemption is not
implied.76 For example, in Departmentof Revenue of Oregon v. ACF Industries,
Inc.,"' the Court held that a railroad could be permitted to pay state property
tax despite a provision of the federal act prohibiting taxes that discriminate
against railroads. Because the property tax was generally applicable to all
property, rather than simply railroads, the tax did not violate Congress' intent
to prohibit discriminatory taxes.78 Thus, even if Congress did not expressly
state that a state law is preempted, the Supremacy Clause dictates that state
law succumb to federal law in the event of a conflict; to preempt, however,
requires a true conflict between purposes or the language of the law.
C. TraditionalState Functions
The courts use caution in preempting state laws concerning powers which
are traditionally given to the states. 79 For example, public health and safety are
matters traditionally governed by the states.80 "When determining the breadth
of a federal statute that impinges upon or pre-empts the States' traditional
81
powers, [courts] are hesitant to extend the statute beyond its evident scope."
73

Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. UAL Corp., Intl Ass'n, 874 F.2d 439,445 (7th Cir. 1989),
affd, 897 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that provision in collective bargaining
agreementviolated Railway Labor Act, and thus, could not be enforced under statelaw).
74504 U.S. at 374.
75

1d. at 388-89.

76

Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747,753 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding
that MDA preempts state actions regarding duty to warn).
77114 S. Ct. 843 (1994).
78
79

1d. at 848.

King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130,1137(1 st Cir.), cert. denied,510 U.S. 824 (1993)
(citing HillsboroughCounty, 471 U.S. at 715).
80CSX Transp., Inc., 507 U.S. at 664; Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37,43 (D.
Mass. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015,1019
(E.D. Mich. 1993).
81Department of Revenue of Oregon v. ACF Indus., 114 S. Ct. 843, 850 (1994) (citing
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2614). See also, HilIsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715 (public health
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Because these powers are traditionally reserved for the states, the courts may
assume that Congress did not intend to preempt them absent a clear statement
of intent from Congress to the contrary.
D. Remedies
Courts also use caution in the preemption of state law claims if preemption
renders a plaintiff without remedy.82 In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee,83 the Court
considered preemption of state tort laws by the federal Atomic Energy Act. 84
In Silkwood, federal regulations governed defendant's nuclear power plant,
which was contaminated with plutonium. Despite an apparent attempt by
Congress to preempt state claims, the Court held that Congress could not have
intended to leave a plaintiff who was exposed to plutonium without a remedy
85
against a corporation simply because the plant was regulated by federal law.
Again, the courts may assume that Congress did not intend to leave injured
plaintiffs without a judicial remedy, absent a clear indication of congressional
intent to do so.
IV.PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT CLAIMS UNDER THE MEDICAL DEVICE
AMENDMENTS

A. The Caselaw on Preemption
The Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.86
on April 23,1996. Medtronic is the only case which the U.S. Supreme Court has
heard on preemption of state tort law by the MDA since its enactment in 1976.87
Medtronic arose from the claims of a patient who was implanted in 1987 with
a Medtronic pacemaker which failed three years later due to a defective wire
carrying electronic impulses to the heart. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

act governing collection procedures did not preempt local ordinance governing other
aspects of blood donation).
82

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238,251-52 (1984) (1It is difficult to believe that
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those
injured by illegal conduct.") However, the cases at hand do not involve illegal conduct
as long as FDA guidelines are complied with, and thus the Silkwood quote does not
apply. Indeed, these cases are just the opposite in that corporationsare tryingtopreempt
claims because they complied with federal law.
83

1d.

8442 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) (1959).
85 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257.
86 Medtronic,116 S. Ct. at 2240.
87
The Court has refused similar cases. See e.g., Michael, 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); Reeves, 44 F.3d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2251 (1995);
Martello, 42 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995).
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held that most of plaintiff's state law tort claims were preempted by the MDA's
provisions governing manufacturing and labeling of medical devices.88
On June 26, 1996, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Medtronic,
written by Justice Stevens, in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg
concurred. 89 Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer
concurred in part, and dissented in part. The Court reversed, in part, the
decision of the Eleventh Circuit, holding that none of the plaintiffs' state law
tort claims were preempted by the Medical Device Amendments. In the process
of making this decision, six other cases to which the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari were remanded in light of the Medtronic decision. 90
The unusual part of this decision was that the Medtronic pacemaker at issue
in the case never went through the PMA process. It entered the market as the
"substantial equivalent" of a device which entered the market prior to the
effective date of the MDA. Thus, neither the Medtronic pacemaker nor its
predecessor were required to undergo the extensive FDA procedures required
to ensure safety and effectiveness. For this reason, the Court refused to preempt
state law tort claims regarding the design of the pacemaker. The MDA did not
regulate the design of the pacemaker, and to preempt claims regarding
products which never went through the PMA process would allow a product
to enter the market without any of the safety protections envisioned by
Congress.
Unfortunately, the Medtronic decision, in combination with other decisions,
creates a complicated web of guidelines in determining what claims are
preempted by the MDA. Even the Supreme Court indicated that preemption
is case-specific and relies heavily upon a factual determination. 91 A general'
principle which can be extracted from each decision is the rule that unless the
FDAhas passed a regulation or instituted testing governing the problem which
the state tort seeks to address, claims under state law are not preempted.
Prior to the Medtronic decision, most caselaw concerning preemption of
state tort claims by the MDA have held that most, orall, state tort claims relating
to a Class III device brought before them are preempted by the MDA. 92 In

88
89

90

Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2249.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. _

64 U.S.L.W. 4625 (1996).

Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 518 U.S. __ 65 U.S.L.W. 1 d136 (1996); English v.
Mentor Corp., 518 U.S. . 65 U.S.L.W. 1 d136 (1996); Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys.,
518 U.S. _ 65 US.L.W. 1 d136 (1996); Mentor Corp. v. Bingham, 518 U.S. 65 U.S.L.W.
1 d136 (1996); Mentor Corp. v. Feldt, 518 U.S. _ 65 U.S.L.W. 1 d136 (1996); Mitchell v.
Collagen Corp., 518 U.S. _ 65 U.S.L.W. 1 d136 (1996).
91
Medtronic, 518 U.S. - 64 U.S.L.W. 4625.
92This conclusion remains the same whether FDA approval was gained properly or
as a result of fraud upon the FDA. Michael, 46 F.3d at 1328-29; Reeves, 44 F.3d at 307;
National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988,992 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994);
Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421; Talbott, 865 F. Supp. at 49. See also, Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985
F.2d 516, 518-19 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 510 U.S. 913 (1993)
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Duncan v. lolab Corp., 93 the court preempted all of plaintiff's negligence, strict
liability, and breach of warranty claims. In Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc.,94 the court
preempted plaintiff's claims for implied warranty, negligent failure to warn,
negligent manufacturing, and implied warranty because the FDA's labeling
requirements and good manufacturing provisions specifically regulated the
areas of manufacturing and warning.
On the other hand, claims relating to a Class I or Class IIdevice are often not
preempted. Class II devices are only subject to the general regulations of the
MDA governing labeling and manufacturing which affect Class I devices,
unless the FDA issues device specific regulations.95 Thus, the FDA generally
has no control over the design of a device, and state tort law is the only remedy
96
available to a plaintiff for defectively designed Class I and Class II devices.
97
For example, in Smith v. Pingree, the court held that a Florida statute
regulating the fitting of hearing aids was not preempted because it did not
govem the same area as the MDA, namely safety of hearing aids. In Anguiano
v. E.L DuPontde Nemours &Co., Inc.,98 a case involving a lawsuitagainst DuPont
for a Teflon-based temporomandibular joint, a Class II medical device, the court
held that preemption of state law tort claims is limited to areas with specific
FDA requirements applicable to the device. In that case, the FDA had not issued
any regulations governing joint implants, and as a Class IIdevice, the joint was
not subject to PMA of its design. Thus, design defect claims were not
preempted.
B. State Torts: Elements
In order to determine which state tort claims are preempted under the MDA,
the courts have utilized a three-step analysis. First, the courts determine what
state "requirements" are.99 State tort law generally holds a manufacturer liable
in tort for defects in design, manufacture or warning regarding a product, or
for strict liability. A manufacturer may also be liable in quasi-contract for a
breach of implied or express warranty. Second, the courts determine the federal
(compliance with FIFRA regulations is an agency determination, not a court
determination).
9312 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1994).
9418 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994).
95

Claims for inadequate warning are preempted, however, due to the labeling
requirements of the MDA. Kimberly-Clark, 38 F.3d at 990 (holding, however, that
manufacturing claims are not preempted despite the good manufacturing provisions).
96
Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1419.
97651 F.2d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981).
9844 F.3d at 810.
99
1n Medtronic, the Supreme Court plurality rejected the idea that a state common
law tort can be labeled a "requirement" on the manufacturer. However, the concurring
justices disagreed.
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requirements on the manufacturer under the MDA.100 Finally, the court must
compare the two requirements to determine if the state law adds anything to
the federal requirement. 101
1. Design Defects
Of all of the tort claims which may be leveled against a manufacturer,
defective design is the least likely to be preempted by the MDA. In fact, each
member of the Supreme Court reached this conclusion with regard to the
pacemaker in Medtronic.10 2 In particular, when a product has not undergone
the PMA process, whether under the grandfather clause, the substantially
equivalent clause, or Class I or II device requirements, design defect claims are
often not preempted.103 On the other hand, a product which has undergone
the rigorous PMA process may be exempt from state tort claims for the defect
in its design, because design is heavily regulated by the FDA under its PMA
process.10 4 Although the Medtronic Court refused preemption of the design
defect claim, Medtronic involved a product which did not undergo the PMA
process. Thus, no conflict occurred between a decision of the FDA regarding
the device's effectiveness and state tort law.
2. Manufacturing Defect Claims
The federal requirements of the MDA include the "Good Manufacturing
Process" statute (GMP).105 Under the GMP statute, the FDA has the authority
to monitor the methods, facilities, controls, packaging, storage, installation,
and all other aspects of manufacturing of any medical device (in any class) to
ensure safe manufacturing processes. Most courts have held that the GMP
preempts state tort law claims of defective manufacture of a product because
the statute specifically regulates manufacture of medical devices. If a product
meets the federal requirements, a manufacturer should not then be held liable
100

See supra § (I)(H), concluding that PMA constitutes a federal requirement.

101

The express preemption provision of the MDA states that the state may not
establish any requirement "which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device.... 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1976).
102518 U.S. ___ 64 U.S.L.W. 4625, 4637.
103

Larsen, 837 P.2d at 1282.

10 4

As the Supreme Court noted in Medtronic, the PMA process is rigorous. Often as
many as 1200 hours are spent evaluating a device under the PMA process. Medtronic,
518 U.S. at _ 64 U.S.L.W. at 4627 (citing Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Healthand the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 384
(1987)). In contrast, devices which do not need to undergo the PMA process may receive
as little as twenty hours of attention to determine their equivalence to products already
on the market. Id. at 4627-4628, citing Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 384

(1987)).
10521 U.S.C. §§ 360j(f), 360j(o(a)(A) (1976).
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under state law because to hold the manufacturer liable essentially creates a
higher standard of liability for the manufacturer than existed under federal law.
Note, however, that the plurality in Medtronic disagreed. To the extent that a
state statute enforces the same or narrower standards upon a manufacturer as
federal law, the statute is not preempted. Section 360(k) merely prevents states
from imposing more stringent requirements upon a manufacturer than federal
law. 106 This simply acts as an incentive to comply with federal law and,
according to the Court, furthers Congress' purposes in enacting the MDA.
In her opinion, however, Justice O'Connor disagreed, stating that the:
FDA's Good Manufacturing Purpose (GMP) regulations impose
comprehensive requirements relating to every aspect of the
device-manufacturing process, including a manufacturer's
organization and personnel, buildings, equipment, component
controls, production and process controls, packaging and labeling
controls, holding distribution, installation, device evaluations, and
record keeping ....

The Lohrs' common-law claims regarding

manufacture would, if successful, impose state requirements 'different
from, or in addition to' the GMP requirements, and are therefore
pre-empted. In similar fashion, the Lohrs' failure-to-warn claim is
pre-empted
by the extensive labeling requirements imposed by the
10 7
FDA.

Again, the Court's decision is split, with the plurality holding that state
common law is not preempted, even by the GM. The result is not so clear,
however, for "specific" state requirements, in light of the concurring opinion of
the Court, which may differ from federal law.
3. Inadequate Warning
Like claims for defective manufacturing of a medical device, claims for
inadequate warning regarding a medical device were, prior to Medtronic,
generally preempted due to comprehensive MDA provisions regarding this
area. 108 Specifically, the MDA's labeling provisions 109 govern the
manufacturer's duty to warn consumers of the proper usage of the device, the
hazards and side-effects thereto, and the prescriptive nature of the device. The
FDA even provides regulations for use of a device not in accordance with the

106

As the Court noted, a narrower state statute is "different from" the federal
requirements. However, the Court refused such a literal reading of section 360(k),
stating that "such a difference would surely provide a strange reason for finding
pre-emption of a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule." Medtronic,518 U.S.
at __ 64 U.S.L.W. at 4632.

107 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at _
08

64 U.S.L.W. at 4638.

1 King, 983 F.2d at 1139; Bravman, 842 F. Supp. at 760-61.
10921 C.F.R. § 801.109 (1976).
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label.11 0 Any state law which adds additional requirements could be to these
federal requirements could be preempted.
However, with the onset of the recent Medtronic decision, the Court has
refused to preempt all state law claims regarding inadequate warning merely
due to the existence of specific provisions within the MDA. Like defective
manufacturing claims, claims regarding the labeling of medical devices are
only preempted if they are more stringent than federal requirements.1 1' In
Florida, where the Medtronic case arose, the "general state common-law
requirements... were not specifically developed 'with respect to' medical
devices. Accordingly, they are not the kinds of requirements that Congress and
the FDA feared would impede the ability of federal regulators to implement
and enforce specific federal requirements." 112 Because of the lack of specificity
in Florida's law, the law did not create an additional burden on Medtronic, and
was not preempted.
4. Strict Liability
Strict liability claims were almost universally preempted by the MDA prior
to Medtronic. The state law of strict liability imposes liability on the
manufacturer of a device regardless of any level of fault. The MDA, to the
contrary, imposes liability (by not approving the device for market) on
products which are unsafe in their manufacture, design, or labeling. 113 Thus,
the state law adds a level of liability not found under the federal law and was
expressly preempted under § 360(k). Again, Medtronic involved a device that
was never tested for safety by the FDA, so such a claim would not bypass a
decision of the FDA.

11021 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1976); Reeves, 44 F.3d at 304-05.
111

Though the Supreme Court cited the preemption provision's statement that state

requirementsare to be preempted if they are "different from orin addition to," Medtronic,
518 U.S. at , 64 U.S.L.W. at 4630 (emphasis added), the Court seemingly abandoned
the express language of the statute in favor of an interpretation that only preempted
state law claims that were different from and in addition to the federal law.
112Medtronic, 518 U.S. at__ 64 U.S.L.W. at 4634. The Court also stated that the federal
requirements "reflect important but entirely generic concerns about device regulation
generally, not thesort of concerns regarding a specific device or field of device regulation
which thestatuteorregulations were designed to protect from potentially contradictory

state requirements." Id. Read together, these provisions indicate that even if a state law
specifically regulates labeling and manufacturing requirements, it would not be
preempted because federal law is not sufficiently specific or comprehensive to indicate
a congressional intent to preempt. However, the court focused on the generality of state
law requirements, and thus a door may have been left open to preempt state law
requirements which are more stringent and specific than those in Florida.
113Medtronic, 56 F.3d at 1350-51.
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5. Warranties

Express warranty claims are a breed of quasi-contract claims. 114 Numerous
courts have held that contract claims do not constitute a "state requirement." 115
Thus, even if a claim for breach of express warranty adds to the federal
requirements under the MDA,116 the express preemption provision of the MDA
only preempts state law actions. A contract is entered into between the parties,
not the state, and thus does not constitute a state-imposed requirement on the
manufacturer.1 1 7 The preemption provision of the MDA does not apply.
Implied warranty claims may be distinguished from express warranty
claims because it is state law that creates a cause of action for implied
warranty.118 Where the parties have not expressly contracted as to the safety of
the goods, the requirement is state imposed as opposed to self-imposed. 119
Because an implied warranty adds requirements for the manufacturer to abide
by, it may be preempted. Again, however, Medtronic refused to preempt implied
warranty claims under common law, at least for products which did not
undergo safety testing by the FDA.
C. The Casefor Implied Preemption
Preemption of a state statute may be implied when the state law is
inconsistent with enforcement of the purposes of the federal law. In preemption
analysis, the court should "consider the relationship between state and federal
laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written. " 120
As a practical matter, in the case of Class III devices and the MDA, neither
of Congress' express purposes is being fully served. The purposes of the MDA
conflict in some cases; both purposes cannot be served at once. However, in an
effort to serve both purposes, the courts have encountered a situation in which
neither purpose is truly effectuated.
Congress' first goal in enacting the MDA, to ensure safety of devices entering
the marketplace, is not met by preemption of claims. To best ensure safety of
devices, all tort claims would need to be permitted. However, to allow all state
tort liability claims would render the MDA meaningless in that it would create
simply a minimum safety standard, yet subject the manufacturers to the same
liability that existed before enactment of the MDA.

1 14

Michael, 46 F.3d at 1325-27.

115Id.; Ministry of Health, Province of Ontario, Canada v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp.

1426, 1439-40 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
1 16

The labeling provisions of the MDA constitute a federal regulation governing the

express warranties of the manufacturer.
117 Michael,46 F.3d at 1325-27.
1 18

Talbott, 865 F. Supp. at 51.

9

11 Michael,46 F.3d at 1325.

12 OJones, 430 U.S. at 527.
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Likewise, Congress' second objective, to further the progress of medicine by
minimizing the cost of placing safe and effective devices on the marketplace,
is also not served by the current state of the law. The law as it stands creates a
complicated web of claims, in which some are preempted and others are not.
121
It is perfectly permissible to preempt some causes of action and not others.
However, to minimize production costs, all causes of action which interfere
with Congress' objectives should be preempted. Beyond the legal fees and
court costs which will be incurred by manufacturers in untangling this web of
cases, the judgments which will be rendered on the claims not preempted are
precisely what Congress intended to avoid by passing the MDA.
The most consistent means for solving this dilemma is through implied
preemption of all state tort causes of action relating to Class III devices which
were approved through the PMA process, or which are substantially similar to
products approved through the PMA process. 12 2 The congressional purpose of
12

1American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817,826 (1995) (Airline Deregulation
Act).
122
There will be some minor inconsistency in treatment of Class III devices because
some such devices have not, either themselves or through theirpredecessors, undergone
the PMA process, and thus would lack preemptive power under this construction.
However, with time, the technology of 1976 should become outdated, so that all
products on the marketplace will be replaced with technology which has either used
the PMA process or is substantially equivalent to technology which has undergone the
PMA process. Preemption of products which have undergone the PMA process from
state tort claims would also serve as an incentive to manufacturers to follow the PMA
process. For this reason, it is advisable not to preempt claims against manufacturers
who gain PMA approval fraudulently. At this time, fraud does not create a private cause
of action. But see Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. at 1439 (the MDA does not preempt a claim
that the manufacturer negligently failed to comply with MDA regulations because the
state law is not imposing a requirement different from or in addition to the federal law);
Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988). Even
the Supreme Court has indicated that illegal actions may create an exemption from the
law of preemption. In Silkwood, the Court considered a case in which a young woman
died from plutonium poisoning. 464 U.S. at 238. The Court held that all tort remedies
could not be preempted, because to do so would leave the plaintiff defenseless against
a manufacturer who had committed a violation of the law. Id. at 251. "It is difficult to
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse
for those injured by illegal conduct." Id.
One example of the deadly possibilities when fraud is used to gain FDA approval
of a Class III medical device was shown in Talbott, 865 F. Supp. at 87. Bard had gained
approval of its 'Mini-Profile" Catheter, used in balloon angioplasty procedures. The
balloon on the catheter was designed to inflate within the patient's artery, unclogging
the artery, and then deflate to resume the flow of blood in the patient's body. However,
the Bard catheter had numerous reported instances of failure to deflate, thus blocking
the flow of blood, and leading to injury or death. Bard personnel realized the problem,
but failed to tell the FDA of the situation. It thus fraudulently obtained FDA approval.
The Talbott court held that the state tort claims were preempted by theMDA. Id. at 43-45.
However, this decision left the decedent's family remediless against a manufacturer
who had illegally gained FDA approval of its product, in violation of the Silkwood
provisions. An alternative would be to permit state tort claims in the event of fraud. The
state tort law would not add an additional requirement to the federal law because it
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safety should theoretically still be served by preemption, because the FDA is
permitted, and indeed required, to regulate the manufacture, design, and
labeling of Class III products to ensure safety.l3 Limiting preemption to
products which have undergone the PMA process (excepting, of course,
products which gain FDA approval fraudulently) would provide a measure of
protection from these devices.
Furthermore, implied preemption would promote the federal goal of
uniform liability of manufacturers. Without the possibility of state regulation
of manufacturers through tort law, liability will be consistent among the states.
Otherwise, a manufacturer would essentially be forced to make the product
comply with the strictest liability laws in the country to avoid liability therein,
a costly and time-consuming endeavor. If this should occur, fewer products
would be available on the market, a result which actually works against public
health and safety. In addition, the cost of developing new products would
remain economically feasible for manufacturers who would pay for the PMA
process, but not state claims. Finally, implied preemption would eliminate the
124
confusion and inconsistencies in the courts regarding preemption.
V. CONCLUSION

In an ideal world, the MDA would provide to the FDA adequate authority
and resources to ensure that only safe and effective devices enter the
marketplace. No state tort actions would be necessary because devices were
designed and manufactured in a safe way. Obviously, such an ideal could never
be reached. As a result, the two objectives of Congress in passing the MDA are

merely requires the manufacturer to comply with the MDA. Most courts have been
hesitant to accept this argument. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 238.
123 Arguably, the objective of safety would be better served if FDA approval through
the PMA process could be gained at a faster pace, so that new products could enter the
marketplace at a faster speed. At least one report has recommended that Congress
provide a "mission statement" to the FDA to streamline the PMA process. HLMA's 40
New Recommendations on Reforming the FDA, supra note 30.
There is no doubt that the FDA, as it currently stands, cannot prevent all dangerous
medical devices from entering the marketplace. See Brief Amici Curiae of American
Association of Retired Persons, et al., supra note 33. Arguably, Congress does not
adequately fund the FDA for the purposes ithas provided. However, such decisions of
funding and establishing the power of agencies are congressional functions. The
determination of how to best protect the public is a congressional determination; the
courts are bound by the law of preemption and Congress' statutes as enacted.
Arguably, today's Congress is more willing to accept that state tort remedies are
needed to ensure the safety and effectiveness of devices on the marketplace. See 141
Cong. Rec. H2941-H2948 (Mar. 9,1995); 141 Cong. Rec. H3027 (Mar. 10, 1995) (allowing
for compensatory damages for medical devices under tort reform bill). Again, however,
any changes must be enacted by Congress, not the courts.
124
Because the Medtronicdecision dealt with a device which did not undergo thePMA
process, and whose predecessors did not undergo the PMA process, implied
preemption would not conflict with the Court's decision if it is limited to cases in which
products were tested extensively by the FDA.
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at odds with each other. To ensure that the most safe and effective devices are
on the marketplace, regulation should include pre-market regulation by the
FDA and post-market regulation through state tort actions. However, to ensure
cost-effectiveness in development of new devices requires a minimum of
25
regulation.1
Regardless of what solution is ideal for balancing these competing
objectives, the courts are bound by the law of preemption.126 The courts are in
the unenviable position of attempting to discern the intent of Congress in
passing the MDA. As most courts have noted, the express preemption
provision of the MDA combined with current preemption law indicates that at
least some state tort claims were intended to be preempted by the MDA.
Unfortunately, the current court decisions have created confusing precedent,
in which some causes of action are preempted and others are permitted. This
current maze of decisions fails to serve either congressional purpose in passing
the MDA. It is possible, however, to fully serve one of Congress' purposes by
preempting all state tort claims for devices which have undergone the PMA
process and received FDA approval. Statutory regulation serves to regulate
potentially dangerous devices before they enter the marketplace-before they
have the opportunity to cause injury or death. Tort actions can only seek to

125

As one source states,
[tlhe law has worked sufficiently well during the last 20 years to
allow the most dramatic era of medical innovation and advancement in history. Overturning the pre-emption would be enough
to bring this dramatic growth in the medical device industry to a
grinding halt.
The court, in one fell swoop, would open the door to the
establishment of 50 new state laws. Essentially, juries would be
making decisions about medical technology, not doctors,
researchers or trained experts at the FDA.
Some 64 percent of device manufacturers in this country have
fewer than 20 employees. It is these small companies that would
be hit the hardest. The threat of crushing litigation and skyrocketing
insurance rates would force them to either pull products from the
market or not conduct any business at all.
Wayne Barlow, Medical Devices go to Supreme Court, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, May
1, 1996.
126

Arguably, prohibiting state tort claims may cause manufacturers to rely on the
FDA to test its products.
The practical effect of these holdings is that FDA approval, which
previously was only permission to market a product, now represents
a virtual 'safe harbor' under the proper conditions. The wisdom of
these decisions is debatable. They may lead manufacturers to assume
a more relaxes attitude toward testing and may encourage them to rely
on the FDA to do the bulk of product testing.
Eric B. Bruce, Avoiding Product Liability Claims: How Much Testing is Enough?, 62 DEF.
CouNs. J. 391, 396 (1995). However, given the cost and time involved in gaining FDA
approval, it is to the manufacturer's benefit to ensure that its device is in a condition to
enable it to pass inspection. Furthermore, it is Congress' responsibility, not the courts,
to determine the best way to further its objectives regarding safety of medical devices.

1995-961

MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS

compensate victims after the harm has already occurred, and tort remedies are
arbitrary.1 27 Assuming that the FDA properly regulates devices before they
enter the marketplace, regulation is kept to a minimum, enabling
manufacturers to develop new devices.12s Safety is still a factor. No one would
disagree that it is better to prevent a dangerous device from entering the
marketplace than to suffer the consequences of such a device on the market.
Implied preemption, then, would create a predictable outcome and permit
manufacturers to feasibly create medical devices to ensure public health and

safety.

12 7

See id. at 397 (arguing that "short of FDA approval of certain products, there is
nothing a manufacturer can do that will guarantee freedom from all future products
liabilities," and providing a checklist of ways to limit the likelihood of product liability
suits).
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The FDA has proposed more stringent regulations for medical device designs,
following a study by the FDA indicating that design defects lead to more than half of
defective product recalls. Paul H. Sunshine, The Preemptive Scope of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976,50 FooD & DRUG L.J. 191,191 (1995).

